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Abstract
We discuss secure computation of modular sum when multiple access channel from distinct players A1, . . . , Ac
to a third party (Receiver) is given. Then, we define the secure modulo sum capacity as the supremum of the
transmission rate of modulo sum without information leakage of other information. We derive its useful lower
bound, which is numerically calculated under a realistic model that can be realizable as a Gaussian multiple access
channel.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, secure multiparty computation has been actively studied even from the information theoretical viewpoint.
One of its simple examples is secure computation of modular sum [1], [2]. This problem has been often discussed
from the Shannon-theoretic viewpoint [3], [4]. If we assume secure communication channels between a part of
players, secure computation of modular sum is possible. Secure communication channels consumes cryptographic
resources. In this paper, instead of such resources, we focus on multiple access channel (MAC), which has been
actively studied for a long time [5], [6], [7]. That is, we study how to realize secure computation via MAC instead of
conventional secure communication channels. As a typical example, we investigate secure computation of modular
sum when a MAC from distinct players A1, . . . , Ac to a third party (Receiver) is given. That is, each player Ai sends
a sequence of their secure random number Mi = (Mi,1, . . . ,Mi,k) ∈ Fkq that is subject to the uniform distribution,
and Receiver recovers only the modulo sums (
∑c
i=1Mi,1, . . . ,
∑c
i=1Mi,k) as Fig. 1. Here, to keep the secrecy, it
is required that Receiver cannot obtain any information except for the modulo sums. In this way, we can compute
the modulo sums. As a simple case [8], [9], we may consider the channel where the output signal Y of the channel
is given as
Y = X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xc ⊕N (1)
with the i-th input variablesXi and the noise variable N , where ⊕ is the modulo sum. When all senders encode their
message by using the same linear code, the receiver cannot obtain any information with respect to each sender’s
message because each message is subject to the uniform distribution. Hence, the code is decodable under the noise
N , the receiver can recover the modulo sums (
∑c
i=1Mi,1, . . . ,
∑c
i=1Mi,k). However, the real channel does not
has such a form. A realistic example is a multiple Gaussian channel, whose typical case is given as follows. The
receiving signal Y takes values in the set of real numbers R, and the i-th sender’s signal Xi takes values in discrete
values {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. Then, a typical channel is given as
Y = E(X1 + · · · +Xc) +N, (2)
where E is a constant and N is the Gaussian variable with average 0 and variance v. In this case, a part of
information for the message of each sender might be leaked to the receiver. To cover multiple Gaussian channels,
this paper addresses a general MAC.
If the secrecy condition is not imposed and the channel is a multiple Gaussian channel, this problem is a simple
example of computation-and-forward [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. Due to the secrecy condition, we
cannot realize this task by their simple application. In the case of c = 2, since the modulo sums give the information
of the other player, the protocol enables the two players to exchange their messages without information leakage to
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Fig. 1. Secure computation of modulo sum via multiple access channel.
Receiver [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23] when Receiver broadcasts the modulo sum to both players. Application
of such a protocol is discussed in several network models [25]. Our protocol can be regarded as an multi-player
extension with a generic setting of the protocol given in [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23].
Further, when we can realize secure transmission of modulo sum with k transmitter, multiplying −1 to the
receiver’s variable, we can realize secure modulo zero-sum randomness among k + 1 players, that is the k + 1
random variables with zero-sum condition and certain security conditions [24, Section 2]. As is explained in [24],
secure modulo zero-sum randomness can be regarded as a cryptographic resource for several cryptographic tasks
including secure multi-party computation of homomorphic functions, secret sharing without secure communication
channel, and a cryptographic task, multi-party anonymous authentication. In this sense, secure transmission of
modulo sum is needed in the viewpoint of cryptography.
In this paper, we formulate the secure modulo sum capacity as the maximum of the secure transmission of
modulo sum via multiple access channel. When the multiple access channel satisfies a symmetric condition, the
secure modulo sum capacity equals the capacity of a certain single access channel. In a general setting, we derive
the lower bound of the secure modulo sum capacity. Further, we give several realistic examples by using Gaussian
multiple access channel, which can be realized in wireless communication.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II prepares notations used in this paper. Section
III defines the secure modulo sum capacity, and gives two theorems, which discusses the symmetric case and the
general case. Section IV gives the proof for the semi-symmetric case. Section V discusses the Gaussian multiple
access channel.
II. NOTATIONS
In this section, we prepare notations and information quantities used in this paper. Given a joint distribution
channel PY,Z1,Z2 over the product system of a finite discrete set Z1 × Z2 and a continuous set Y , we denote
the conditional probability density function of PY |Z1,Z2 by pY |Z1,Z2(y|z1, z2). Then, we define the conditional
distribution PY |Z2 over a continuous set Y conditioned in the discrete set Z2 by the conditional probability density
function pY |Z2(y|z2) :=
∑
z2∈Z2
PZ2(z2)pY |Z1,Z2(y|z1, z2). Then, we define two types of the Re´nyi conditional
mutual information I1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2)
sI1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2)
:= log
∑
z1,z2
PZ1,Z2(z1, z2)
∫
Y
pY |Z1,Z2(y|z1, z2)
1+s
pY |Z2(y|z2)
s
dy (3)
s
1 + s
I
↓
1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2)
:= log
∑
z2
PZ2(z2)
∫
Y
(∑
z1
PZ1|Z2(z1|z2)pY |Z1,Z2(y|z1, z2)
1+s
) 1
1+s
dy (4)
3for s > 0. Since lims→0 sI1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2) = lims→0 sI
↓
1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2) = 0, taking the limit s→ 0, we have
lim
s→0
sI1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2)
s
= lim
s→0
sI
↓
1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2)
s
= I(Y ;Z1|Z2), (5)
where I(Y ;Z1|Z2) expresses the conditional mutual information. Also, we have
I
↓
1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2) ≤ I1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2) ≤ I
↓
1
1−s
(Y ;Z1|Z2). (6)
The concavity of the function x 7→ x
1
1+s yields
e
s
1+s
I
↓
1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2,Z3) ≤ e
s
1+s
I
↓
1+s(Y ;Z1,Z2|Z3). (7)
Given a channel PY |Z1,Z2,Z3 from the finite discrete set Z1 ×Z2 ×Z3 to a continuous set Y , when the random
variables Z1, Z2, Z3 are generated subject to the uniform distributions, we have a joint distribution among Y,Z1, Z2.
In this case, we denote the Renyi conditional mutual information and the conditional mutual information by
I1+s(Y ;Z1|Z2)[PY |Z1,Z2,Z3 ] and I(Y ;Z1|Z2)[PY |Z1,Z2,Z3 ], respectively.
Further, we denote the vector (xi)i∈I by ~xI . When each element xi belongs to the same vector space, we use
the notation
xI :=
∑
i∈I
xi. (8)
The set {1, . . . , c} is simplified to [c].
III. SECURE MODULO SUM CAPACITY
Consider c players and Receiver. Player Ai has a random variable Mi ∈ Fkq and broadcast it to all players. The
task of Receiver is computing the modulo sum M[c] ∈ Fkq . Also, it is required that Receiver obtains no other partial
information of {Mi}
c
i=1. That is, when Receiver’s information is denoted by Y ∈ Y
n, we impose the following
condition
I(Y; ~MJ ) ∼= 0 (9)
for any non-empty set J $ [c], where ~MJ := (Mi)i∈J . We call this task secure transmission of common reference
string.
To realize this task, we employ a multiple access channel (MAC) W with c input alphabets X1, . . . ,Xc and an
output alphabet Y , which might be a continuous set. Here, the i-th input alphabet Xi is under the control of Player
Ai. That is, given element (x1, . . . , xc) ∈ X1 × . . . × Xc, we have the output distribution W(x1,...,xc) on Y . When
Receiver is required to compute the modulo sum of elements of Fknq with the above security condition, we employ n
uses of the multiple access channel W . Here, we use the bold font like Y,xj ,Xj , ~YJ to express n symbols while
the italic font like Y, xj ,Xj , ~YJ expresses single symbol. Receiver’s variable Y ∈ Y
n obeys the output distribution
of the channel W (n), which is defined as the distributions W
(n)
(x1,...,xc)
:= W(x1,1,...,xc,1)× · · · ×W(x1,n,...,xc,n) on Y
n
for (x1, . . . ,xc) ∈ X
n
1 × . . .× X
n
c .
The encoder is given as a set of stochastic maps Φ
(n)
i,e from F
kn
q to X
n
i with i = 1, . . . , c. The decoder is given as
a map Φ
(n)
d from Y
n to Fknq . The tuple ((Φ
(n)
i,e )
c
i=1,Φ
(n)
d ) is simplified to Φ
(n) and is called a code. The performance
of code Φ(n) is given by the following two values. One is the decoding error probability
ǫ(Φ(n)) :=
1
qkn
∑
m1,...,mc,m
′
m′ 6=
∑
c
j=1 mj
W
(n)
(Φ(n)i,e (mi))i=1,...,c
((Φ
(n)
d )
−1(m′)), (10)
where the sum is taken with respect to m1, . . . ,mc,m
′ ∈ Fknq with the condition m
′ 6=
∑c
j=1mj . The other is the
leaked information
IJ (Φ
(n)) := I(Y; ~MJ ) (11)
for a non-empty set J $ [c]. The transmission rate is given as kn log q
n
.
4When a sequence of codes {Φ(n)} satisfies the conditions
ǫ(Φ(n))→ 0 (12)
and
IJ (Φ
(n))→ 0 (13)
for a non-empty set J $ [c], the limit lim supn→∞
kn log q
n
is called an achievable rate. The secure modulo sum
capacity CSMS(W ) is defined as the supremum of achievable rates with respect to the choice of the sequence codes
as well as the prime power q.
Now, we assume that Xi is an l-dimensional vector space over a finite field Fq. Also, Y is a symmetric space
for Fq, i.e., for an element x ∈ Flq, there is a function fx on Y such that fx1 ◦ fx2 = fx1+x2 . Here, the collection
of functions f = (fx) is called an action of Flq on Y . A multiple access channel W is called symmetric when the
relation
Wx1,...,xc(Bf,x) = Wx1+x,...,xc(B) = · · · = Wx1,...,xc+x(B) (14)
holds for a measurable subset B ⊂ Y , where Bf,x := {fx(y)}y∈B .
For a symmetric multiple access channel W , we define the symmetric single access channel WS as
WS,x := Wx,0,...,0, (15)
which includes the channel (1).
Theorem 1: For a symmetric multiple access channel W , we have
CSMS(W ) = C(WS), (16)
where C(WS) is the channel capacity of the channel WS .
Its proof is very simple. In this case, the transmission of modulo sum is the same as the information transmission
under the symmetric single access channel WS . Due to the symmetric condition, the secrecy is automatically
satisfied. However, it is not so easy to realize a symmetric multiple access channel W . Here, we remark the
relation with the existing papers [8], [9], which address a similar channel. However, they consider the information
leakage to the third party with respect to the modulo sum. This paper considers the information leakage to the
receiver with respect to the message of each player etc.
For the general case, instead of Theorem 1, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Assume that Xi is an l-dimensional vector space over Fq as X . We prepare notations I(W ) :=
I(Y ;X[c])[W ], Jj := {i ∈ J |i 6= j}, and ~XJ := (Xi)i∈J .
When a multiple access channel W satisfies
I(W ) > I(Y ;Xi| ~XJi)[W ] (17)
I(W )(1 + |J c|) > I(Y ;Xi ~XJ c | ~XJi)[W ] (18)
I(W )|J c| > I(Y ; (Xj −Xj′)j,j′∈J c | ~XJi)[W ] (19)
for J $ [c] and i ∈ J , we have
CSMS(W ) ≥ min
i∈J$[c]
min
(
I(W )− I(Y ;Xi| ~XJi)[W ],
(|J c|+ 1)I(W )− I(Y ;Xi, ~XJ c | ~XJi)[W ],
|J c|I(W )− I(Y ;Xi, (Xj −Xj′)j,j′∈J c | ~XJi)[W ]
)
. (20)
Under the notation I(Y ;Xi| ~XJi)[W ], the symbols W , Y , Xi, ~XJi , and ~X[c]\J correspond to PY |Z1,Z2,Z3 , Y ,
Z1, Z2, and Z3 in the definition of I(Y ;Z1|Z2)[PY |Z1,Z2,Z3 ], respectively.
Due to Lemma 2 of Appendix, the maximum maxj∈J$[c] I(Y ;Xj |
~XJj )[W ] is realized when |[c] \ J | = 1. The
mutual information I(W ) is a generalization of the achievable rate with F2 given in [27].
5IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Step (1): We construct our code randomly. First, we prepare the dimension k′n for scramble random variables Li
for i = 1, . . . , c, and choose kn and k
′
n as follows.
lim
n→∞
kn + k
′
n
n
log q < I(W ) (21)
lim
n→∞
k′n + (kn + k
′
n)|J
c|
n
> I(Y ;Xi, ~XJ c | ~XJi)[W ] (22)
lim
n→∞
k′n
n
> I(Y ;Xi| ~XJi)[W ] (23)
lim
n→∞
k′n + (kn + k
′
n)(|J
c| − 1)
n
> I(Y ;Xi, (Xj −Xj′)j,j′∈J c | ~XJi)[W ] (24)
for J $ [c] and i ∈ J .
Then, we randomly choose a pair of an invertible linear map G1 from F
kn+k′n
q ×F
nl−(kn+k′n)
q to X n and a linear
map G2 from X
n to Fnl−(kn+k
′
n)
q such that G2 ◦G1(F,E) = E. Also, we randomly choose a pair of an invertible
linear map G3 from Fknq ×F
k′n
q to F
kn+k′n
q and a linear map G4 from F
kn+k′n
q to Fknq such that G4 ◦G3(M,L) = M .
Hence, G1 and G3 uniquely determine G2 and G4, respectively. Additionally, we impose the universal2 condition
Pr{G2(x) = G2(x
′)} ≤
1
qnl−(kn+k
′
n)
(25)
Pr{G4(f) = G4(f
′)} ≤
1
qk
′
n
(26)
for x 6= x′ ∈ X n and f 6= f ′ ∈ Fkn+k
′
n
q .
We also randomly and independently choose the random variable Ei subject to the uniform distribution on
Fnl−(kn+k
′
n)
q for i = 1, . . . , c. Hence, G1, G3, and E1, . . . , Ec are priorly shared among players and Receiver. Then,
we consider the following protocol. That is, using the random variable G1, G3, and Ei, we define the encoder Φ
(n)
i,e
as follows. For a given Mi, Player Ai randomly chooses the scramble random variable Li. That is, each player Ai
transmits G1(G3(Li,Mi), Ei). Here, the variables G1, G3, ~M, ~L, ~E are assumed to be independent of each other.
Then, we have the relation
Fi = G3(Li,Mi), Xi = G1(Fi, Ei). (27)
Since ~E is subject to the uniform distribution on Fc(nl−(kn+k
′
n))
q , even when the maps G1 and G3 are fixed, ~X is
subject to the uniform distribution on X cn. Receiver receives the random variable Y ∈ Yn that depends only on
~X. That is, we have the Markov chain (G1, G3, ~M, ~L, ~E) − ~X −Y. Due to (21), Receiver can decode M[c] and
L[c] from Y by using the knowledge E[c] for the coset.
Step (2): We divide the leaked information to several parts that can be bounded. Given J ⊂ [c], we discuss the
leaked information for MJ :=
∑
i∈J Mi. For
~MJ := (Mi)i∈J , using J˜i := {j ∈ J |j < i}, we have
I(Y; ~MJ |G1, G3, ~E)
=
∑
i∈J
I(Y;Mi| ~MJ˜i , G1, G3,
~E)
(a)
≤
∑
i∈J
I(Y;Mi| ~MJi , ~LJi , G1, G3, ~E)
=
∑
i∈J
I(Y;Mi| ~MJi , ~LJi , G1, G3, ~EJi , ~EJ ci )
=
∑
i∈J
I(Y;Mi|~XJi , G1, G3, ~EJ ci )
=
∑
i∈J
I(Y;Mi| ~EJ c , ~XJi , G1, G3, Ei),
6where (a) follows from Eq. (35) in Appendix.
Step (3): We focus on the randomness of the choice of G3. Then, for s ∈ [0,
1
2 ], we have
I(Y;Mi|G3, G1, Ei, ~EJ c , ~XJi)
(a)
≤q−sk
′
nesI1+s(Y;Fi|G1,Ei,
~EJc , ~XJi)
(b)
≤q−sk
′
ne
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Fi|G1,Ei, ~EJc , ~XJi)
(c)
≤q−sk
′
ne
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Fi,Ei|G1, ~EJc , ~XJi)
(d)
=q−sk
′
ne
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Xi|G1, ~EJc , ~XJi)
(e)
≤q−sk
′
n−s(kn+k
′
n)|J
c|e
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Xi, ~XJ c |~XJi)
+ q−sk
′
ne
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Xi|~XJi )
+ q−sk
′
n−s(kn+k
′
n)(|J
c|−1)e
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Xi,(Xj−Xj′ )j,j′∈J c |~XJi)
, (29)
where (a) follows from Theorem 4 of [29] and (26); (b) follows from the second inequality in (6); (c) follows
from (7); (d) follows from the fact that the pair (Ei, Fi) and Xi uniquely determine each other; and (e) follows
from Appendix B. Due to Conditions (22) – (24), all the terms in (29) go to zero exponentially. Hence, we obtain
Theorem 2. 
Remark 1: Theorem 2 cannot be shown by simple application of the result of wire-tap channel [28] as follows.
Consider the secrecy of the message M1 of player A1. In this case, if other players transmit elements of X
n
with equal probability, the channel from player A1 to Receiver is given as n-fold extension of the channel x 7→
1
q
∑
x2,...,xc
Wx,x2,...,xc , which enables us to directly apply the result of wire-tap channel. However, other players
transmit elements of the image of G, which is a subset of X n, with equal probability. Hence, the channel from
player A1 to Receiver does not have the above simple form. Therefore, we need more careful discussion.
Remark 2: In this proof, Receiver does not use the knowledge E1, . . . , Ec except for
∑c
i=1Ei. Hence, there is
a possibility that the transmission rate can be improved by using this knowledge.
V. GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
A. Real case
First, we consider the Gaussian multiple access channel (2), in which Y is R and Xi is Fp. Using the Gaussian
distribution Pa with the average a and variance v on R, we have the channel as Wx1,...,xc := PE(x1+...+xc). In this
case, we have
I(W ) = h(
∑
x1,...,xc
P(x1+...+xc)E
pc
)
−
p∑
j=0
1
p
h(
c∑
i=1
α(i, j)
pc−1
P(j+ip)E) (30)
max
j∈J$[c]
I(Y ;Xj | ~XJj )[W ]
(a)
= I(Y ;X1| ~X{2,...,c−1})[W ] (31)
= h(
∑p−1
j,j′=0 Pjj′E
p2
)− h(
∑p−1
j=0 PjE
p
), (32)
where h is the differential entropy and α(i, j) is the number of elements (x1, . . . , xc) ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}
c satisfying∑c
i′=1 xi′ = j + ip. Here, (a) follows the discussion after Theorem 2. When p = 2 and c = 3, our lower bound is
h(P0+2PE+2P2E+P3E6 )− h(
P0+2P2E
3 )− h(
P0+2PE+P2E
4 ) + h(
P0+PE
2 ), which is numerically calculated as Fig. 2.
When E goes to infinity, the distributions {PiE}
c(p−1)
i=0 can be distinguished so that I(W ) goes to log p and
h(
∑p−1
j,j′=0
Pjj′E
p2
) − H(
∑
p−1
j=0 PjE
p
) goes to H(Qp) − log p =
∑p−1
j=−p+1
|j−p|
p2
log p|j−p| , where the distribution Qp on
{−p + 1, 2, . . . , p − 1} is defined as Qp(j) :=
|j−p|
p2
. Hence, our lower bound of the secure modulo sum capacity
goes to
∑p−1
j=−p+1
|j−p|
p2
log |j − p|. For example, when p = 2, it is 12 log 2.
72 4 6 8
Power
-0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Lower bound
Fig. 2. Our lower bound of secure modulo sum capacity with p = 2 when three senders send information (c = 3) and the variance
v is 1. The base of logarithm is chosen to be e. The horizontal axis expresses the power E. The vertical axis expresses our lower bond
h(P0+2PE+2P2E+P3E
6
)+h(P0+PE
2
)−h(P0+2P2E
3
)−h(P0+2PE+P2E
4
) This lower bound approaches 1
2
log 2 and is positive with E ≥ 2.1715.
B. Complex case
Next, we consider the case when Y is C, and discuss the case with Xi = F7 as a typical case [15], [17]. Let
Pa be the Gaussian distribution with the average a and variance v on C. We define the map u from F7 to C as
follows.
u(0) = 0, u(6) = E, u(7) = Ee
2pi
3
i, u(8) = Ee
pi
3
i,
u(1) = Ee
4pi
3
i, u(3) = Ee
5pi
3
i, u(2) = −E. (33)
Then, we define Wx1,...,xc := P(u(x1)+...+u(xc))E . Hence, we have (31). Due to the same reason as the above case,
when E goes to infinity, I(W ) goes to log 7 and I(Y ;X1| ~X{2,...,c−1})[W ] goes to
∑6
j=−6
|j−7|
72 log
7
|j−7| , Hence,
our lower bound of the secure modulo sum capacity goes to
∑6
j=−6
|j−7|
72 log |j − 7|.
VI. CONCLUSION
To discuss the generation of common reference string via a multiple access channel, we have introduced the
secure modulo sum capacity for a multiple access channel. We have shown that the secure modulo sum capacity
equals the channel capacity when the multiple access channel satisfies the symmetric condition. Since the symmetric
condition does not hold in a natural setting, we have derived a lower bound for the secure modulo sum capacity
in a general setting. We have examined this lower bound under the real and complex Gaussian multiple access
channels with numerical analysis.
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APPENDIX A
CONDITIONAL MUTUAL INFORMATION
We prepare a lemma for conditional mutual information.
Lemma 1:
I(A;B|CD) = −I(B;C|D) + I(A;B|D) + I(B;C|AD). (34)
In particular, when I(B;C|D) = 0, we have
I(A;B|D) ≤ I(A;B|CD). (35)
8Proof. This equation can be shown as follows.
I(A;B|CD) + I(B;C|D) = I(AC;B|D)
=I(A;B|D) + I(B;C|AD). (36)

APPENDIX B
PROOF OF STEP (e) IN (29)
Given ~xJ c ∈ X
|J c| and G1, we introduce the following conditions for ~x
′
J c ∈ X
|J c|.
(C1) ~x′J c 6= ~xJ c .
(C2) (G2(x
′
j))j∈J c = (G2(xj))j∈J c .
(C3) (x′j − x
′
j′)j,j′∈J c 6= (xj − xj′)j,j′∈J c .
(C4) (x′j − x
′
j′)j,j′∈J c = (xj − xj′)j,j′∈J c .
In the following, we denote the sum with respect to ~x′J c ∈ X
|J c| under the conditions (C1) and (C2) by∑
~x′
J c
:(C1)(C2), etc. Using the condition (25), we have
EG1
∑
~x′
J c
:(C1)(C2)(C3)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~x′Jc ,
~XJi
(y) ≤
∑
~x′
Jc
:(C1)(C3)
q(−nl+(kn+k
′
n))|J
c|P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~x′Jc ,
~XJi
(y)
≤
∑
~x′Jc
q(−nl+(kn+k
′
n))|J
c|P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJc=~x′J c ,
~XJi
(y)
= q(kn+k
′
n)|J
c|P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJi
(y) (37)
EG1
∑
~x′
J c
:(C1)(C2)(C4)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~x′Jc ,
~XJi
(y) ≤
∑
~x′
Jc
:(C1)(C4)
q−nl+(kn+k
′
n)P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJc=~x′Jc ,
~XJi
(y)
≤
∑
~x′
Jc
:(C4)
q−nl+(kn+k
′
n)P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJc=~x′′J c ,
~XJi
(y)
= q(kn+k
′
n)P
Y |Xi=xi,(Xj−Xj′=xj−xj′ )j,j′∈J c , ~XJi
(y). (38)
To show the step (e) in (29), we define the set S(G2, ~EJ c) := {~xJ c ∈ X
|J c||G2(xj) = Ej for j ∈ J
c}. Using
9(37) and (38), for s ∈ [0, 12 ], we have the following relations, where the explanations for steps is explained later.
e
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Xi|G1, ~EJc , ~XJi)
.
=E~XJi , ~EJc ,G1
(∫
Y
∑
xi
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~EJc ,G1, ~XJi
(y)
1
1−s dy
)1−s
=E~XJi , ~EJc ,G1
(∫
Y
∑
xi
(
q−(kn+k
′
n)|J
c|
∑
~xJ c∈S(G2, ~EJc)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJc=~xJ c , ~XJi
(y)
) 1
1−s
dy
)1−s
(a)
≤E~XJi
(∫
Y
∑
xi
E ~EJ c ,G1
(
q−(kn+k
′
n)|J
c|
∑
~xJc∈S(G2, ~EJc)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y)
) 1
1−s
dy
)1−s
=E~XJi
(∫
Y
∑
xi
q
−
(kn+k
′
n)
1−s
|J c|E ~EJc ,G1
( ∑
~xJ c∈S(G2, ~EJc )
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y)
·
(
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y) +
∑
~x′
J c
:(C1)(C2)(C3)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJc=~x′J c ,
~XJi
(y)
+
∑
~x′Jc :(C1)(C2)(C4)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~x′Jc ,
~XJi
(y)
) s
1−s
)
dy
)1−s
=E~XJi
(∫
Y
∑
xi
q
−
(kn+k
′
n)
1−s
|J c|
(
q−(nl−(kn+k
′
n))|J
c|
∑
~xJ c
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y)
· EG1
(
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJc=~xJ c , ~XJi
(y) +
∑
~x′
Jc
:(C1)(C2)(C3)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~x′Jc ,
~XJi
(y)
+
∑
~x′
Jc
:(C1)(C2)(C4)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~x′Jc ,
~XJi
(y)
) s
1−s
)
dy
)1−s
(b)
≤E~XJi
(∫
Y
∑
xi
q
−
(kn+k
′
n)
1−s
|J c|
(
q−(nl−(kn+k
′
n))|J
c|
∑
~xJ c
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y)
·
(
EG1
(
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y) +
∑
~x′J c :(C1)(C2)(C3)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJc=~x′J c ,
~XJi
(y)
+
∑
~x′
Jc
:(C1)(C2)(C4)
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~x′Jc ,
~XJi
(y)
)) s
1−s
)
dy
)1−s
(c)
≤E~XJi
(∫
Y
∑
xi
q
−
(kn+k
′
n)
1−s
|J c|
(
q−(nl−(kn+k
′
n))|J
c|
∑
~xJ c
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y)
·
(
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y) + q(kn+k
′
n)|J
c|P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJi
(y)
+ q(kn+k
′
n)P
Y |Xi=xi,(Xj−Xj′=xj−xj′ )j,j′∈Jc , ~XJi
(y)
) s
1−s
)
dy
)1−s
(d)
≤E~XJi
(∫
Y
∑
xi
q
(−nl− s
1−s
(kn+k′n))|J
c|
∑
~xJ c
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJ c , ~XJi
(y)
·
(
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJ c=~xJc , ~XJi
(y)
s
1−s + q
s
1−s
(kn+k′n)|J
c|
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJi
(y)
s
1−s
+ q
s
1−s
(kn+k′n)P
Y |Xi=xi,(Xj−Xj′=xj−xj′ )j,j′∈Jc , ~XJi
(y)
s
1−s
)
dy
)1−s
10
=E~XJi
(∫
Y
∑
xi
q
(−nl− s
1−s
(kn+k′n))|J
c|
∑
~xJc
P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJc=~xJc , ~XJi
(y)
1
1−s
+ P
Y |Xi=xi, ~XJi
(y)
1
1−s
+ q(−
s
1−s
(kn+k′n)−nl)(|J
c|−1)
∑
~xJ c :(2)
P
Y |Xi=xi,(Xj−Xj′=xj−xj′ )j,j′∈J c , ~XJi
(y)
s
1−s
)
dy
)1−s
=q−s(kn+k
′
n)|J
c|e
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Xi, ~XJc |~XJi)
+ e
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Xi|~XJi)
+ q−s(kn+k
′
n)(|J
c|−1)e
sI
↓
1
1−s
(Y;Xi,(Xj−Xj′ )j,j′∈J c |~XJi )
,
(39)
where each step can be shown as follows. (a) follows from the concavity of x 7→ x1−s with x ≥ 0. (b) follows
from the concavity of x 7→ x
s
1−s with x ≥ 0. (c) follows from the inequalities (37) and (38). (d) follows from the
inequality (x+ y + z)
s
1−s ≤ x
s
1−s + y
s
1−s + z
s
1−s with x, y, z ≥ 0.
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